Socio-economic inequalities in home-care use across regional long-term care systems in Europe by Floridi, Ginevra et al.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
King’s Research Portal 
 
DOI:
10.1093/geronb/gbaa139
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication record in King's Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Floridi, G., Carrino, L., & Glaser, K. (2020). Socio-economic inequalities in home-care use across regional long-
term care systems in Europe. Journals of Gerontology Series. B, Psychological Sciences and Social Sciences,
[gbaa139]. https://doi.org/10.1093/geronb/gbaa139
Citing this paper
Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may
differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination,
volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are
again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
•Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
•You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
•You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 03. Dec. 2020
  
Socio-economic inequalities in home-care use across regional long-term care systems in 
Europe 
 
Ginevra Floridi, PhD1 
Ludovico Carrino, PhD1 
Karen Glaser, PhD1 
 
1 Department of Global Health & Social Medicine, King’s College London 
 
Corresponding author:  
Ginevra Floridi  
ginevra.floridi@kcl.ac.uk 
3.21 Bush House, NE Wing, 30 Aldwych, London WC2B 4BG, United Kingdom. 
 
Word count: 5,982 
References: 39 
Tables: 4 
Figures: 1 
 
This work is part of the IN-CARE (Inequality in Care) project (http://in-care.fk12.tu-
dortmund.de/). It was supported by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) 
(grant number: ES/S01523X/1). 
The authors gratefully acknowledge the helpful comments received from Prof. Mauricio 
Avendano and from the participants to the KCL/CLS seminar series on Health, Life course and 
Ageing. We thank Rachel Stuchbury and Yasmina Amzour for their help in collecting 
contextual data and preparing the dataset. We also wish to thank two anonymous reviewers for 
their helpful feedback on our work.  
There are no conflicts of interest to declare. 
Author contributions: G. Floridi conceptualised and designed the study, carried out the statistical analyses and 
drafted the manuscript. L. Carrino conceptualised and designed the study, supervised the analyses, reviewed and 
revised the manuscript. K. Glaser conceptualised and designed the study, critically reviewed the results of analyses 
and reviewed and revised the manuscript. 
  
  
Abstract  
Objectives. We examine whether socio-economic inequalities in home-care use among 
disabled older adults are related to the contextual characteristics of long-term care (LTC) 
systems. Specifically, we investigate how wealth and income gradients in the use of informal, 
formal, and mixed home-care vary according to the degree to which LTC systems offer 
alternatives to families as the main providers of care (“de-familisation”). 
Methods. We use survey data from SHARE on disabled older adults from 136 administrative 
regions in 12 European countries and link them to a regional indicator of de-familisation in 
LTC, measured by the number of available LTC beds in care homes. We use multinomial 
multilevel models, with and without country fixed-effects, to study home-care use as a function 
of individual-level and regional-level LTC characteristics. We interact financial wealth and 
income with the number of LTC beds to assess whether socio-economic gradients in home-
care use differ across regions according to the degree of de-familisation in LTC. 
Results. We find robust evidence that socio-economic status (SES) inequalities in the use of 
mixed-care are lower in more de-familised LTC systems. Poorer people are more likely than 
the wealthier to combine informal and formal home-care use in regions with more LTC beds. 
SES inequalities in the exclusive use of informal or formal care do not differ by the level of 
de-familisation. 
Discussion. The results suggest that de-familisation in LTC favours the combination of formal 
and informal home-care among the more socio-economically disadvantaged, potentially 
mitigating health inequalities in later life. 
 
Keywords: Long-term care; multilevel models; socio-economic status; SHARE. 
  
Introduction 
Governments in ageing societies are grappling with the issue of long-term care (LTC). 
Projected increases in disability mean that many countries face challenges in meeting the 
growing care needs of an ageing population (Colombo et al., 2011). LTC refers to policies that 
support older people with limitations in everyday activities (Colombo et al., 2011). In Europe, 
recent LTC reforms have aimed to curb expenditures by promoting a shift from LTC provided 
in care homes (i.e. care provided in non-acute residential and nursing facilities) to formal home-
based care, increasing emphasis on family support (European Commission, 2018; Fernandez 
et al., 2016). Greater reliance on families through reductions in publicly provided or subsidised 
LTC services may restrict access to formal care especially among individuals from lower socio-
economic status (SES) groups. This is because poorer individuals are less able to purchase 
formal care on the market than the rich, and consequently more likely to rely exclusively on 
informal care, typically provided by families (Agree & Glaser, 2009; Carrino et al., 2018; 
Suanet et al., 2012). This may act to exacerbate socio-economic inequalities in care use and 
provision across families. To date, it remains unclear whether and how LTC system 
characteristics are associated with socio-economic inequalities in informal and formal home-
care use. 
European LTC systems differ with respect to de-familisation, defined as the degree to which 
the state or the market, as opposed to families, take responsibility for the provision of care 
(Leitner, 2003; Saraceno & Keck, 2010; Saraceno, 2016). While socio-economic gradients in 
(in)formal (i.e. formal and informal) home-care use appear to vary across countries according 
to the level of de-familisation in LTC, evidence from comparative studies is scant, and limited 
to comparing groups or typologies of countries (Albertini & Pavolini, 2017; Broese van 
Groenou et al., 2006; Carrieri et al., 2017). Our research addresses two major gaps in the 
  
literature on care inequalities. First, by testing for interactions between individual SES 
indicators and LTC system characteristics, we examine whether de-familisation is associated 
with inequalities in (in)formal home-care use among community-dwelling disabled older 
adults. Second, we exploit within-country regional variation in LTC systems. This represents 
a considerable improvement over country-level comparisons because, in many European 
countries, LTC characteristics vary substantially across administrative regions (Eurostat, 
2019). This study advances previous research linking inequalities in care to features of LTC 
systems (Albertini & Pavolini, 2017; Broese van Groenou et al., 2006). It is timely as, 
throughout Europe, LTC systems rely increasingly less on formal care provision, either in care 
homes or through formal home-care (European Commission, 2019). 
We conceptualise informal care as personal care from kin and non-kin, and formal home-care 
as paid home-care from public or private providers. Given the interdependent nature of these 
forms of care (Bonsang, 2009; Motel-Klingebiel et al., 2005), we analyse them simultaneously 
to provide a comprehensive understanding of inequalities in home-care use. Using 2015 data 
from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), we investigate whether 
wealth and income gradients in (in)formal home-care use among older disabled Europeans 
relate to the number of available LTC beds in care homes  across 136 regions in 12 countries. 
We consider high numbers of LTC beds as indicative of de-familisation, in contrast to 
familism, which refers to LTC settings where the family is assumed to be the main provider of 
care (Saraceno, 2016). 
Individual-level inequalities in care use  
Andersen and Newman’s (2005) behavioural model of healthcare suggests that socio-economic 
differences in care use reflect differences in individual needs, predisposing and enabling factors 
(Broese van Groenou et al., 2006). Physical and cognitive health determine needs for care, 
  
which are generally higher among individuals in lower-SES groups (Ilinca et al., 2017). Gender 
and age represent predisposing factors for care, and their distribution varies by SES (Broese 
van Groenou et al., 2006). Enabling factors refer to individuals’ social, material and financial 
resources. These include education, which may enhance individuals’ ability to navigate the 
care system; family structure, which determines the availability of potential caregivers (Broese 
van Groenou et al., 2006); and ownership of material resources such as a home or car, which 
can facilitate care provision or access (Vlachantoni et al., 2015). Last, financial resources relate 
to care use primarily by influencing individuals’ ability to purchase care (Rodrigues et al., 
2018). The model predicts that once health, predisposing factors, social and material resources 
are controlled for, any residual socio-economic disparities in care use solely reflect differences 
in financial resources (Rodrigues et al., 2018). 
Wealth and income capture financial resources. Financial wealth is generally a better indicator 
of SES for those over age 60 (Robert & House, 1996; Tanaka et al., 2011). This is because 
income tends to reduce considerably after retirement, while wealth captures the cumulative 
effects of lifetime advantages and disadvantages with respect to material resources (Kaplan et 
al., 1987; Robert & House, 1996). We use both financial wealth and income as indicators of 
financial resources. Financial wealth may be strongly associated with informal care use through 
its connection to family resources and intergenerational transfers, which may be made in 
exchange for care (Rodrigues et al., 2018). Being more readily disposable than wealth, income 
may have a stronger impact on the ability to purchase formal home-care (Rodrigues et al., 
2018). 
Empirical evidence on the association between SES and care use is inconclusive. While some 
research finds that, across Europe, those in lower-SES groups are more likely to receive 
informal (Broese van Groenou et al., 2006; Vlachantoni et al., 2015) or formal support 
(Rodriguez, 2014), other studies find that those in higher-SES groups report higher use of both 
  
informal (Bakx et al., 2015; Rodriguez, 2014) and formal care (Albertini & Pavolini, 2017). 
The conflicting evidence has been partly explained by differences in the socio-economic 
indicators used, such as income versus wealth (Rodrigues et al., 2018). Other scholars argue 
that socio-economic inequalities in care use play out differently across different LTC systems 
(Albertini & Pavolini, 2017). However, as we argue below, evidence from comparative 
research is limited. 
De-familisation, familism, and inequalities in care use 
LTC encompasses both informal care (from family or non-kin) and formal care (formal home-
care or in care homes). European LTC systems differ in the extent to which the responsibility 
for care lies with the state, the market or the family (Kalmijn & Saraceno, 2008). LTC systems 
characterised by de-familisation (equivalently, “de-familised” LTC systems) offer alternatives 
to informal care, thereby reducing family responsibility. By contrast, familism refers to settings 
where policies, cultural norms and preferences emphasise the family as the sole or main 
provider of care (equivalently, “familistic” contexts) (Kalmijn & Saraceno, 2008; Leitner, 
2003; Saraceno & Keck, 2010). In familistic contexts, family support often involves intensive 
care, including daily personal care (Brandt et al., 2009). Norms and obligations around family 
care also tend to be stronger than in de-familised contexts (Leitner, 2003; Saraceno & Keck, 
2010), where family support is more frequently directed towards help rather than personal care 
(Brandt et al., 2009). While previous studies have broadly classified Northern European 
countries as de-familised and Southern European countries as familistic (Brandt et al., 2009), 
the wide fragmentation of LTC policies even within countries suggests that country-level LTC 
typologies risk being overly simplistic (European Commission, 2018; Saraceno & Keck, 2010). 
We add to the literature by considering features of the LTC systems at the sub-national 
(regional) level. 
  
The degree of de-familisation in LTC may shape the distribution of (in)formal home-care use 
by SES by determining the extent to which individuals of different SES are able to access 
formal care (Saraceno, 2010). Higher de-familisation may alleviate socio-economic 
inequalities in formal or mixed home-care use by providing alternatives to family care among 
lower-SES groups. In contrast, lower de-familisation (i.e. higher familism) may lead to 
exclusive reliance on informal care especially among poorer individuals, who may be unable 
to afford alternatives to family care (Saraceno, 2010). Interactions between LTC system 
characteristics and individual SES have not been previously tested.  
Empirical evidence 
Few studies analyse inequalities in (in)formal home-care from a comparative perspective, 
showing mixed results. Motel-Klingenbiel et al. (2005) find no socio-economic gradient in 
informal care use in any of the countries studied, which have varying levels of de-familisation 
(England, Germany, Israel, Norway, and Spain). Broese van Groenou and colleagues (2006) 
find that the poor are more likely than the rich to use informal care from outside the household 
in Britain and the Netherlands, but not in Italy and Belgium (relatively less de-familised 
countries). Studies on inequalities in formal home-care use find  that those with higher incomes 
are more likely to use formal home-care than poorer individuals in countries where de-
familisation is low (Italy and Germany), but not where de-familisation is high (Denmark and 
the Netherlands) (Albertini & Pavolini, 2017; Bakx et al., 2015). Ilinca et al. (2017) find that 
the poor are relatively more likely to use formal care than the rich in Denmark and the 
Netherlands, but not elsewhere in Europe. Carrieri et al. (2017) compare formal care 
inequalities across three European regions and find that the rich use more formal care than the 
poor in Southern and Continental Europe, but not in Northern Europe, where LTC expenditure 
is higher (indicating higher de-familisation). 
  
All the studies noted above either compare a few countries, providing qualitative descriptions 
of their LTC systems (Albertini & Pavolini, 2017; Broese van Groenou et al., 2006); or cluster 
countries into macro-groups (e.g. North and South), concealing considerable within-group 
variation (Carrieri et al., 2017). Therefore, these studies are unable to explicitly estimate 
interactions between LTC system characteristics and individual SES in determining (in)formal 
home-care use. Moreover, the approach of taking countries as the primary units of comparison 
disregards substantial internal variation and fragmentation in LTC systems. For example, 
service availability and eligibility rules for public LTC vary greatly across administrative 
regions in countries like Belgium or Italy (Brugiavini et al., 2017; Eurostat, 2019). 
Aims and hypotheses 
We analyse wealth and income gradients in informal and formal home-care use by disabled 
individuals aged 65+, and we compare these gradients across regions with different degrees of 
de-familisation in LTC. Following previous literature on care inequalities (Rodrigues et al., 
2018), we refer to SES gradients as being either “pro-poor” (indicating that the poor receive 
more of a certain type of care than the rich) or “pro-rich” (indicating that the rich receive more 
of a certain type of care than the poor). We are ultimately interested in whether wealth and 
income gradients in informal, formal and mixed-care become relatively more pro-poor or 
relatively more pro-rich as the level of de-familisation in LTC varies across regions. Our use 
of these terms carries no normative connotation: for example, if the SES gradient in the 
exclusive use of informal care is “more pro-poor” in a certain region (relative to another), it is 
not necessarily beneficial to the wellbeing of the poor in that region, as it may indicate that 
they are less able to access formal home-care. Our three hypotheses about how socio-economic 
inequalities in informal and formal home-care vary across areas are: 
  
• H-a: The higher is the level of de-familisation, the less pro-poor is the SES gradient in 
the exclusive use of informal care. Greater availability of formal care may make the 
poor relatively less likely to rely only on informal care compared to the rich. 
• H-b: The higher is the level of de-familisation, the more pro-poor is the SES gradient 
in the exclusive use of formal home-care. Greater availability of formal care may 
facilitate access to formal home-care among the poor more than among the rich (e.g. by 
reducing the cost of formal home-care). 
• H-c: The higher is the level of de-familisation, the more pro-poor is the SES gradient 
in the exclusive use of mixed (i.e. both formal and informal) care. Higher de-
familisation may facilitate access to formal home-care for poorer (compared to richer) 
individuals, without decreasing their reliance on informal care networks. 
Drawing on earlier work showing how wealth and income relate to care use (Rodrigues et al., 
2018), we also hypothesise that: 
• H-d: On average, wealth has a stronger association with the exclusive use of informal 
care than income, as it may affect such care through intergenerational transfers and 
bequests. 
• H-e: On average, income has a stronger association with the exclusive use of formal 
care than wealth, as it may more directly affect one’s ability to purchase such care. 
We employ information on the number of beds available in care homes by region (“LTC beds” 
henceforth). In particular, higher LTC beds availability indicates higher de-familisation, and 
lower LTC beds availability indicates lower de-familisation. De-familisation in LTC systems 
may occur through two channels: LTC provision in care homes (public or privately paid), and 
formal home-care provision (public or privately paid). Our LTC beds indicator captures the 
first of these components. Ideally, it would be complemented by an indicator of formal home-
  
care provision, such as expenditure on home-care services. However, comparative data on 
home-care services are not available at the regional level in Europe.  
It should be emphasised that our analysis relates to (in)formal care received at home in a 
community-dwelling sample (excluding individuals living in care homes). A potential concern 
is that LTC beds is inversely related to formal home-care, as regions with fewer LTC beds may 
invest more resources in formal home-care services. While comparative regional-level data on 
home-care services are not available to directly test this, in supplementary tables 1a and 1b (see 
Supplementary material) we show that LTC beds is strongly and positively correlated with 
public expenditures on both care homes (+0.83) and formal home-based care (+0.62) across 
the countries in our sample. If the same holds true at regional level, LTC beds offers several 
advantages as an indicator of de-familisation.  
First, among different forms of LTC, care in care homes is highly “external” to the family, as 
it is provided full-time and is typically less reliant on family involvement (Saraceno & Keck, 
2010). As such, it represents a stronger form of de-familisation compared to formal home-care 
services, which are usually mediated by family members (e.g. organising and co-providing 
care). Second, LTC beds indicates availability of LTC services as opposed to measures of 
service use (e.g. percentage of population receiving care), which would more strongly correlate 
with the same unobserved characteristics related to (in)formal care use, our outcome of interest. 
Third, LTC beds is relatively stable over time (Eurostat, 2019), suggesting it is a good proxy 
for the structural characteristics of LTC systems as opposed to year-specific population 
structure or macro-economic factors such as gross domestic product (GDP) (which we control 
for in the analysis). Finally, LTC beds is, to the best of our knowledge, the only comparative 
LTC indicator available at regional level (Eurostat, 2019), allowing us to exploit variation in 
LTC systems across and within countries.  
  
 
Methods  
Data and sample selection 
We analyse data from the sixth wave (2015) of SHARE, a multidisciplinary survey 
representative of individuals aged 50 and older not living in care homes across Europe (Börsch-
Supan et al., 2013; Börsch-Supan & Jürges, 2005). It contains information on respondents’ 
demographic, socio-economic and health characteristics, and on their use of home-care from 
informal and formal providers. Since our outcome of interest is care use, we restrict our analytic 
sample to disabled individuals (Rodriguez, 2014), defined as respondents aged 65+ who report 
long-term difficulties performing at least one of a set of 23 activities including Activities of 
Daily Living (ADL), Instrumental ADL (IADL) and mobility items. A list of these activities is 
presented in Appendix 1 (Supplementary material). Our results are robust to using alternative 
definitions of disability (supplementary tables 7–12, Supplementary material). Since SHARE 
is not representative of the population living in care homes, we focus on home-care use only. 
We exclude 157 respondents who live in a care home and/or report receiving temporary 
nursing-home care in the past year. In addition, we only use observations from 12 countries for 
which regional-level LTC indicators are available from Eurostat (2019); namely, Austria, 
Belgium, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia1, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain, Sweden, 
and Switzerland. Our analytic sample consists of 15,403 individuals.  
Measures 
Outcome. We define care use as the self-reported use of personal home-care in the previous 12 
months. Personal care includes help with tasks such as dressing, walking and eating, but 
excludes help with household chores or paperwork. Respondents give information on who 
provides care and the frequency of care use, from which we create a categorical variable 
  
indicating whether respondents report receiving: i) no care; ii) exclusively informal care from 
any kin or non-kin (e.g., partners, children, friends) at least once per week2; iii) exclusively 
formal care in the form of professional or paid home-care; or iv) a combination of informal 
and formal care – mixed care. 
Income and wealth. Our main explanatory variables are financial wealth and income. Financial 
wealth is measured at household level as the sum of financial assets minus debts. This excludes 
housing wealth, defined as the value of all residential dwellings owned by the household, minus 
any debt owed on those dwellings. Income is measured at benefit-unit level (i.e. at couple level 
if with a partner). Both wealth and income are equivalised for household or benefit-unit 
composition (Hagenaars et al., 1994), and measured in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) Euros 
for comparability across countries. We trim extreme values (the top and bottom 1%) and, 
following previous studies, apply the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation (arcsinh) to 
approximate a normal distribution (Bellemare & Wichman, 2020; Belloni et al., 2019). The 
arcsinh approximates the natural logarithm and allows retaining zero- and negative-valued 
observations (e.g. to capture debt). Coefficients on arcsinh-transformed variables can be 
interpreted similarly as coefficients on log-transformed variables, as we discuss in greater detail 
in Appendix 2 (Supplementary material). 
Individual-level control variables. Following our theoretical framework (Andersen & 
Newman, 2005) and previous studies (Albertini & Pavolini, 2017; Vlachantoni et al., 2015), in 
all the multivariate models we control for predisposing factors (gender and age); need factors 
(ADL, IADL, and mobility limitations; diagnosed chronic conditions; poor self-rated health; 
and low cognitive function); social resources (education; marital status; parental and child co-
residence status); and material resources (home ownership and access to a car). The coding of 
these variables is outlined in table 1. 
  
Regional-level indicators. Our macro-level indicator of de-familisation is the number of LTC 
beds per 1000 inhabitants in 2015, at regional level using the Nomenclature of Territorial Units 
for Statistics (NUTS-2) classification from Eurostat (2019)3. We also employ regional 
indicators for PPP-adjusted GDP per capita (in 1000 Euros), and for the percentage of 
population aged 65+ in 2015 (Eurostat, 2019). 
Statistical analysis 
We conceptualise home-care use as the result of need, predisposing and enabling factors at the 
individual level (Andersen & Newman, 2005), and of LTC system de-familisation at the 
regional level. We adopt a multinomial multilevel framework with individuals nested within 
regions, and regions nested within countries. 
First, we fit a “baseline” random-effects model (M1b) of care-use on all individual-level 
covariates and the macro-level indicator for LTC beds, as well as region and country random 
intercepts. These allow for the average level of each type of care to vary randomly across 
regions within countries, and across countries. In order to estimate how the probability of 
receiving each type of care varies by SES at different levels of de-familisation in LTC, we add 
a cross-level interaction between wealth and LTC beds to the model (M1w), and do the same 
for income in a separate model (M1i). All models include individual-level characteristics as 
controls, coded as described in table 1. 
The multilevel random-effects model assumes that LTC beds is uncorrelated with the region 
and country random intercepts (Snijders & Bosker, 2012). However, this indicator is likely 
correlated with regional or country characteristics that also affect home-care use, such as 
population structure, spending on public services, and cultural norms around family caregiving 
(Saraceno & Keck, 2010). Consequently, the coefficient for the cross-level interaction may 
confound effects of care-inequalities that are attributable to either LTC de-familisation or to 
  
other unobserved macro-level factors. We therefore estimate more restrictive models that 
account for country-level unobserved heterogeneity by replacing the country random intercept 
with country fixed-effects. Moreover, since the number of beds is likely correlated with 
regional population structure and macro-economic characteristics, we control for regional GDP 
per capita and percentage of population aged 65+. We label these models as M2b (no 
interaction terms), M2w (interaction for wealth-inequality), and M2i (interaction for income-
inequality). These models exclude Switzerland, for which regional GDP data are unavailable. 
We perform all analyses using Stata 15. 
 
Results  
Descriptive sample characteristics 
Table 1 shows descriptive sample statistics by type of care received. In line with previous 
research (Broese van Groenou et al., 2006; Vlachantoni et al., 2015), individuals receiving only 
informal care (10.6% of the sample) are more likely to be married, have co-resident children 
and own their home, compared with formal or mixed-care users. Individuals receiving only 
formal care (4.4%) are disproportionately female and older, report less severe disability and 
better self-rated health. They have higher average financial wealth and income but are less 
likely to have a car in the household compared to other care recipients. Mixed-care users (4.5%) 
have worse health and lower financial wealth than the other groups, and lower income 
compared to those receiving only formal care. 
In table 2 we report descriptive statistics (by country) for our regional-level indicators of LTC 
beds, GDP per capita and the share of 65+ population. These statistics are obtained from 
Eurostat (2019) for the sample of 136 regions in 12 countries for which SHARE data are 
  
available. The average number of LTC beds across regions is 8.48/1000 inhabitants, with large 
variation both across and within countries, e.g., in Spain, Italy and Austria.  
In figure 1 we describe the patterns of care utilisation in our data by splitting our sample of 
respondents into three groups defined by regional-level tertiles of number of LTC beds. We 
then compare the relative allocation of informal, formal and mixed-care among care recipients 
in each group of regions. We find that, among care recipients, the percentage of respondents 
using any formal care (i.e. formal-only or mixed) is nearly twice as high in regions with many 
LTC beds (>11.1/1000) than in regions with few LTC beds (<7/1000). Conversely, care 
recipients in regions with few LTC beds are most likely to rely exclusively on informal care.  
When looking jointly at all sources of care (informal and/or formal), we note that the share of 
respondents receiving any care is lower in regions with high LTC beds (17%) compared to 
regions with low or medium LTC beds (21%). These descriptive differences may be related to 
population characteristics (e.g. health and age), summarised for our sample in supplementary 
table 2 (Supplementary material). In our models, we control for a large set of individual socio-
demographic characteristics and for country fixed-effects, which account for other unobserved 
compositional differences.  
Baseline model 
The results from the baseline random-effects model (M1b) are reported in supplementary table 
3 (Supplementary material), and confirm the theoretical predictions (Albertini & Pavolini, 
2017; Andersen & Newman, 2005; Broese van Groenou et al., 2006). Poorer individuals are 
more likely to exclusively use informal care in comparison to those with higher wealth, and 
individuals with lower incomes are less likely to use only formal home-care than wealthier 
individuals. These findings are robust to including country fixed-effects and regional covariates 
(M2b, supplementary table 4, Supplementary material). In the random-effects model M1b, 
  
individuals in regions with more LTC beds are, on average, less likely to rely exclusively on 
informal care, and more likely to rely on formal-only or mixed home-care, in line with previous 
literature (Suanet et al., 2012) and descriptive evidence (figure 1). However, this finding is not 
robust when accounting for country fixed-effects and regional controls (supplementary table 4, 
Supplementary material). In model M2b, there is no significant association between LTC beds 
and the probability of receiving each type of care.  
Interaction models 
We first estimate models without country fixed-effects, where we interact the indicator for LTC 
beds with wealth (M1w) and income (M1i), respectively. We then estimate models M2w and 
M2i, where we additionally include country fixed-effects and regional controls. We separately 
report coefficients on the interaction-effect between LTC beds and wealth (table 3) or income 
(table 4), for each care-type outcome. In order to interpret interaction coefficients in non-linear 
models, we calculate Average Marginal Effects (AMEs), which indicate the predicted change 
in the probability of receiving each type of care corresponding to a unit change in the variable 
of interest (log-wealth or log-income). We compute AMEs at three levels of LTC beds:  
• Low: 2.55/1000 = 20th percentile (e.g. Lower Silesia, Poland); 
• Intermediate: 9.10/1000 = median (e.g. Trento, Italy); 
• High: 12.43/1000 = 80th percentile (e.g. Lower Normandy, France). 
In computing AMEs, all other covariates are held at their observed values and random 
parameters are integrated out.  
Informal care only 
Wealth. Table 3 shows that poorer individuals are more likely than wealthier individuals to rely 
exclusively on informal care (M1w, panel a). An increase in financial wealth by about 10% 
  
corresponds to a decrease in the probability of receiving only informal care by 0.01–0.02 
percentage points (p.p.) (see Appendix 2, Supplementary material). These marginal changes 
are small when compared to the average probability of receiving only informal care (10.6%). 
Moreover, such associations are not statistically different across levels of LTC beds (the 
confidence intervals largely overlap), failing to substantiate H-a in relation to wealth. This 
result is robust to adding country fixed-effects and regional-level controls to the model (M2w, 
panel a). 
Income. For income (table 4), the results from the random-intercepts model (M1i, panel a) 
confirm the existence of a pro-poor gradient in informal care use, however with weaker 
statistical significance. As before, such inequalities do not change with the level of LTC beds, 
not substantiating H-a. Income gradients in informal care use are more pro-poor in regions with 
fewer beds when country fixed-effects and regional controls are included (M2i, panel a). 
However, the confidence intervals for different regions largely overlap. Comparing the 
estimated AMEs suggests that informal care use is more strongly (negatively) associated with 
wealth than it is with income, in line with H-d. 
Formal care only 
Wealth. Wealth is not associated with the probability of receiving only formal care, regardless 
of LTC beds and model specification (table 3: M1w and M2w, panel b). Thus, we find no 
evidence for H-b in relation to wealth inequalities.  
Income. As shown in table 4, formal home-care use has a significant pro-rich income gradient, 
with a 10% increase in income corresponding to a 0.05–0.06 p.p. increase in the probability of 
relying exclusively on formal care, relative to an average probability of formal care use of 
4.4%. However, such inequalities do not vary with LTC beds, therefore not substantiating H-
b. In the fixed-effects model (M2i, panel b) income gradients in formal care are more strongly 
  
pro-rich in regions with fewer beds, but the confidence intervals overlap, not fully 
substantiating H-b. As hypothesised (H-e), income has a stronger (positive) association with 
exclusive formal care use than wealth.  
Mixed care 
Wealth. We find a significant interaction between wealth and LTC beds for mixed-care use 
(table 3: M1w, panel c). In regions with low numbers of LTC beds, we find pro-rich 
inequalities, namely a 0.02p.p. increase in the probability of mixed-care use for a 10% increase 
in wealth (the average prevalence of mixed-care use is 4.5%); while in regions with high LTC 
beds, the gradient is pro-poor (0.01p.p. decrease in care use probability for a 10% increase in 
wealth). These results are robust to adding country fixed-effects and regional controls (M2w, 
panel c), and strongly support H-c in relation to wealth inequalities. 
Income. Results for income are in line with those for wealth in the model with random-effects 
only, as we find pro-rich income gradients in mixed-care use in regions with low and 
intermediate LTC beds, while no socio-economic gradient exists in regions with high LTC beds 
(table 4: M1i, panel c). However, when adding country fixed-effects and regional controls, 
differences in income gradients are no longer significant across levels of LTC beds (M2i, panel 
c), suggesting that they may be driven by differences in other macro-level factors.  
Sensitivity analyses 
We check the robustness of the estimated standard errors by performing bootstrapping with 
100 sample replications. For the resampling, individuals are clustered within regions to 
preserve the multilevel structure of the data. Supplementary tables 5 and 6 (Supplementary 
material) compare robust and bootstrapped standard errors for the main coefficients of interest, 
and strongly confirm our main results. 
  
Our analytic sample includes respondents who report difficulties with any of a set of activities 
including ADLs, IADLs and mobility tasks (see Appendix 1, Supplementary material). In 
supplementary tables 7–12 (Supplementary material), we show that our results are robust to 
alternative definitions of disability, such: (i) at least one IADL or ADL limitation; (ii) at least 
1 ADL limitation; and (ii) at least 2 ADL limitations.  
Finally, the coefficients on cross-level interactions may be biased as the random intercept 
model implicitly assumes that all the variation in wealth or income gradients is explained by 
LTC beds (Heisig & Schaeffer, 2019). To account for unobserved heterogeneity in the effect 
of wealth/income across regions, we add random slopes for wealth and income to the models 
with country fixed-effects and regional controls (supplementary table 13, Supplementary 
material). Our main results are confirmed, with pro-rich wealth-inequalities in mixed-care in 
regions with fewer beds, and no wealth inequalities in regions with more beds. The results for 
income are unchanged when adding a random slope to the model. We additionally find pro-
rich wealth gradients in exclusive-formal care use that are not detected in previous models (not 
different across levels of LTC availability, and only significant for regions with intermediate 
LTC beds).  
 
Discussion 
This study has assessed whether socio-economic inequalities in the use of informal, formal and 
mixed home-care vary across European regions with different levels of de-familisation in LTC. 
Hypotheses H-a and H-b are not supported by the analysis. While poorer individuals seem more 
likely to rely exclusively on informal care from kin and non-kin, this result is independent of 
the number of LTC beds by region. Similarly, we find a pro-rich income gradient in formal 
  
care use in line with our expectation that income is linked with the ability to purchase formal 
care. However, this gradient is independent of regional-level indicators of LTC de-familisation. 
In support of hypothesis H-c, we find that wealth gradients in mixed-care vary by the regional 
number of LTC beds. In regions with more LTC beds (indicating higher de-familisation) wealth 
gradients in mixed-care are pro-poor, whereas pro-rich gradients are found in regions with 
fewer LTC beds. While the magnitude of these gradients is small in absolute terms, they are 
statistically significant and in opposite directions. Importantly, they have been estimated 
controlling for a wide range of individual and macro-level characteristics, including indicators 
of health and SES. The same result is found for income, but not confirmed under stricter model 
specifications. Consistent with hypotheses H-d and H-e, income has a stronger association with 
formal care, while wealth has a stronger association with informal and mixed care. 
Our study has several limitations. First, since SHARE targets community-dwelling individuals, 
we are unable to study inequalities in the use of care homes, which is strongly related to de-
familisation in LTC. Second, our indicator of de-familisation in LTC systems does not 
distinguish between privately paid and publicly provided or subsidised LTC beds. Therefore, 
we cannot draw conclusions about the implications of public care for inequalities in (in)formal 
home-care use. Third, as previously noted our LTC beds indicator does not capture de-
familisation through formal home-care provision. This might affect our findings to the extent 
to which the number of LTC beds represent the “flip-side” of availability of formal home-care 
(i.e. if regions with higher LTC-beds have lower levels of formal home-care). However, this is 
unlikely to be a concern in our setting, for two main reasons. First, at country level, LTC beds 
are positively correlated with public home-care expenditure in our sample of countries 
(supplementary tables 1a-b, Supplementary material); in our analyses, we assume the same to 
be true at the regional level. Second, if a higher number of LTC beds actually indicated lower 
de-familisation across regions, then we would expect to find that the rich are more likely than 
  
the poor to use home-care when LTC-beds are higher (as formal home-care availability would 
be lower). In other words, we would find inequalities in mixed-care to be more “pro-rich” in 
regions with higher LTC beds than in regions with lower LTC beds. However, we find an 
opposite result, in that inequalities in mixed-care use are more “pro-poor” when LTC-beds are 
higher. This suggests that our estimates of how SES inequalities change when de-familisation 
increases may actually be conservative. Ideally, future comparative research on care-use 
inequalities would benefit from considering a broader range of LTC system indicators, 
including home-care expenditure and the availability and amount of cash-for-care benefits. 
Unfortunately, these data are not currently available at regional level. Moreover, while LTC 
policies in many European countries are implemented at the NUTS-3 level (European 
Commission, 2019), comparative data on LTC beds are not available at this level of 
aggregation.  
In terms of data limitations, SHARE is not designed to be representative of regional populations 
and, for some of the countries under study, some regions are not represented (e.g. Aosta Valley 
in Italy). Finally, the cross-sectional design of our study does not allow for investigating the 
implications of policy changes for inequalities in care use, which is a fruitful avenue for future 
research. 
This study advances research that theoretically links inequality in care use to LTC system 
characteristics, in particular the degree to which alternatives are provided that reduce family 
responsibilities for care (Saraceno, 2010; 2016). It represents the first study to formally test for 
interactions between individual SES and contextual features of LTC systems in relation to 
(in)formal care use. We show that de-familisation in LTC relates to socio-economic gradients 
in the use of formal and informal care combined (mixed-care). This finding is important at a 
time when European countries are progressively shifting care responsibilities toward families 
in order to minimise the rise in LTC costs associated with population ageing (Colombo et al., 
  
2011; European Commission, 2019), raising issues of limited LTC coverage for dependent 
older people (Brugiavini et al., 2017; Hashiguchi & Llena-Nozal, 2020). Crucially, if mixed-
care is a preferred or more beneficial option among older disabled adults (Pinquart & Sörensen, 
2002), greater reliance on families for LTC provision may act to widen socio-economic 
disparities in health and wellbeing among older Europeans (Bonsang, 2009) 
 
Footnotes 
1 Since Estonia is not divided into NUTS-2 regions, we consider the whole country as a single region. This implies 
that we cannot distinguish the country-effect from that of LTC beds for Estonia. However, replicating all the 
analyses excluding Estonia from the sample does not change the results. Therefore, we include it to maximise the 
sample size. 
2 We restrict informal care to care received “at least once a week” following Michaud, Heitmueller, and Nazarov 
(2010) who define meaningful caregiving as 5 hours/week. 
3 Only 2013 data are available for France, and only 2011 data for Belgium. We use these figures since equivalent 
indicators at the national level show no substantial change between these years and 2015 for either country 
(Eurostat, 2019). 
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Table 1: Descriptive sample characteristics, overall and by care type 
  Total By type of care received: 
   
No care 
Informal 
care only 
Formal 
care only 
Mixed 
care 
Predisposing factors       
 Sex: female % 62.5 62.5 59.1 67.3 64.5 
 Age (years) mean 75.7 74.8 78.1 81.1 81.3 
Need factors       
 ADL limitations a: none % 73.6 84.8 27.8 41.4 13.5 
   1 limitation % 13.2 10.4 26.9 24.5 19.0 
   2+ limitations % 13.2 4.8 45.3 34.1 67.5 
 IADL limitations a: none % 63.3 74.1 19.8 25.5 8.6 
   1 limitation % 17.0 16.7 22.0 18.6 10.4 
   2+ limitations % 19.7 9.2 58.2 55.9 81.0 
 N. mobility limitations b mean 3.50 2.94 5.84 4.99 6.68 
 Any chronic conditions c: yes % 82.2 80.0 91.0 87.3 92.6 
 Poor self-rated health: yes % 21.9 15.5 51.3 33.1 55.4 
 Low cognitive function d: yes %   7.6   5.7 14.9 14.7 16.0 
Social resources       
 Education e: lower secondary % 52.6 50.2 63.2 59.9 62.5 
   upper secondary % 31.9 33.1 27.1 27.6 26.6 
   tertiary % 15.5 16.7   9.7 12.6 10.9 
       
 Marital status: married % 60.8 62.2 64.6 33.1 54.7 
   never married %   4.3   4.5   2.7   5.0   4.9 
   separated or divorced %   7.8   8.3   4.6   9.8   4.5 
   widowed % 27.0 25.0 28.1 52.1 35.9 
       
 Parental status f: childless %   9.6   9.2   7.6 16.6 13.3 
   children outside household % 73.1 74.0 66.8 76.2 67.6 
   coresident child/ren % 17.4 16.7 25.6   7.2 19.1 
Material resources       
 Home ownership g: yes % 70.7 71.8 70.8 58.5 62.2 
 Access to a car h: yes % 57.2 61.8 43.1 29.5 35.2 
Financial resources       
 Financial wealth (PPP-adj.) mean 162,213 181,124 85,043 103,944 63,326 
 Income (PPP-adj.) mean 47,301 50,053 32,446 48,131 32,258 
       
Sample sizes  15,403 12,395 1,635 683 691 
Sample proportions   80.5 10.6 4.4 4.5 
 
a. Coded as whether respondent has 0 limitations; 1 limitation; or 2+ limitations (see Appendix 1 for a list of activities) 
b. min = 0, max = 10 (see Appendix 1 for a list of activities) 
c. = 1 if respondent reports any diagnosed chronic condition, excluding hypertension 
d. = 1 if respondent has either a low memory score (i.e. fewer than 8 out of 20 words recalled) or a low time orientation 
score (i.e. two or more mistakes in identifying day of the week, date, month and year). 
e. Coded using ISCED 1997: up to lower secondary (ISCED 0-2); upper secondary (ISCED 3-4); tertiary (ISCED 5-6). 
f. Coded as whether respondent is childless, has all children living outside household, or has at least one co-resident child. 
g. = 1 if the household owns the home where the respondent lives. 
h. = 1 if anyone in the household where the respondent lives owns a car. 
  
Table 2. Regional sample characteristics, summary statistics calculated by country. Statistics calculated from the sample of 136 regions. 
Country 
Number of regions 
in the sample 
LTC beds/1000 inhabitants  GDP per capita (1000s, PPP-adj.)  Percentage population 65+  
  Mean (SD) Min - Max Mean (SD) Min - Max Mean (SD) Min - Max 
Austria 9 8.06 (2.18) 5.21 – 11.67 36.9 (6.73) 26.1 – 45.3 18.6 (1.56) 16.7 – 20.7 
Belgium 11 11.89 (1.95) 7.75 – 15.10 32.9 (11.1) 21.9 – 59.3 17.8 (2.16) 13.1 – 22.1 
Croatia 2 2.23 (0.09) 2.17 – 2.29 17.1 (0.71) 16.6 – 17.6 19.1 (1.24) 18.2 – 20.0 
Czech Republic 8 7.03 (1.46) 3.84 – 8.53 25.4 (11.4) 18.8 – 53.3 17.8 (0.61) 16.7 – 18.3 
Estonia 1 8.61 (n / a) 8.61 – 8.61 22.0 (n / a) 22.0 – 22.0 18.8 (n / a) 18.8 – 18.8 
France 22 10.76 (2.75) 5.53 – 14.92 26.7 (5.89) 22.8 – 51.5 19.9 (2.54) 14.0 – 24.6 
Germany 16 12.00 (1.69) 9.96 – 14.65 34.7 (9.51) 24.3 – 60.1 21.7 (1.92) 18.9 – 25.0 
Italy 18 4.09 (2.81) 0.50 – 9.10 27.3 (7.38) 16.7 – 42.3 22.2 (2.51) 17.6 – 28.0 
Poland 16 1.91 (0.27) 1.52 – 2.55 17.1 (2.76) 13.7 – 22.2 15.4 (1.03) 13.6 – 17.2 
Spain 18 8.87 (4.79) 1.68 – 22.27 25.6 (5.32) 18.2 – 36.1 18.8 (3.50) 11.1 – 24.0 
Sweden 8 13.80 (2.38) 10.04 – 17.02 34.0 (7.27) 28.9 – 51.4 20.7 (2.50) 15.7 – 23.4 
Switzerland 7 11.75 (1.56) 8.62 – 13.42 n/a n/a 18.1 (1.71) 16.7 – 21.6 
Sample 
total/average  
136 8.48 (4.52) 0.50 – 22.27 27.9 (9.18) 13.7 – 60.1 19.3 (3.03) 11.1 – 28.0 
Note: authors’ calculations based on Eurostat (2019) regional data 
  
Table 3. Wealth inequalities: Average marginal effects (AMEs) for financial wealth at specified levels of LTC beds from fully-adjusted models 
of home care use. All covariates fixed at observed values, and random parameters integrated out. 
Type of care (a) Informal only (b) Formal only (c) Mixed 
   AME (95% CI)   AME (95% CI) AME (95% CI) 
M1w (country and region random intercepts) 
Log wealth    
  at beds = 2.55 - 0.002 (- 0.004 ; - 0.001) 0.000 (- 0.000 ;   0.001) 0.002 (  0.001 ;   0.003) 
  at beds = 9.10 - 0.002 (- 0.003 ; - 0.000) 0.001 (- 0.000 ;   0.001) 0.000 (- 0.001 ;   0.001) 
  at beds = 12.43 - 0.001 (- 0.003 ;   0.000) 0.001 (- 0.001 ;   0.002) - 0.001 (- 0.002 ;   0.000) 
Individual controls   Yes   Yes   Yes 
Regional controls   No   No   No 
    
n (individuals)   15,403   15,403   15,403 
n (regions)   136   136   136 
n (countries)   12   12   12 
M2w (region random intercepts and country fixed-effects) 
Log wealth    
  at beds = 2.55/1000 - 0.002 (- 0.004 ; - 0.001)    0.000 (- 0.001 ;   0.002)    0.002 (  0.001 ;   0.004)  
  at beds = 9.10/1000 - 0.001 (- 0.002 ; - 0.000)    0.000 (- 0.001 ;   0.001)    0.000 (- 0.001 ;   0.001)  
  at beds = 12.43/1000 - 0.001 (- 0.002 ;   0.001)    0.000 (- 0.001 ;   0.001)  - 0.001 (- 0.002 ; - 0.000) 
Individual controls   Yes   Yes   Yes 
Regional controls   Yes   Yes   Yes 
    
n (individuals)   14,730   14,730   14,730 
n (regions)   129   129   129 
n (countries)   11   11   11 
Note: 95% Confidence intervals (CIs) in parentheses. AMEs highlighted in bold if 95% CI does not include 0 (p<0.05).  Individual controls:  sex, age, ADL, IADL, 
mobility, chronic conditions, self-rated health, cognitive function, education, marital status, parent and child coresidence status, home ownership, access to car. Regional 
controls: GDP per inhabitant (PPP-adjusted), percentage of population aged 65+ over total.
  
Table 4. Income inequalities: Average marginal effects (AMEs) for income at specified levels of LTC beds from fully-adjusted models of 
home care use. All covariates fixed at observed values, and random parameters integrated out. 
Type of care (a) Informal only (b) Formal only (c) Mixed 
   AME (95% CI)   AME (95% CI) AME (95% CI) 
M1i (country and region random intercepts) 
Log income    
  at beds = 2.55/1000 - 0.006 (- 0.016 ;   0.003)    0.006 (  0.001 ;  0.010)    0.008 (  0.003 ;  0.013)  
  at beds = 9.10/1000 - 0.005 (- 0.010 ; - 0.000)    0.006 (  0.003 ;  0.009)    0.003 (  0.000 ;  0.006)  
  at beds = 12.43/1000 - 0.004 (- 0.010 ;   0.002)    0.005 (  0.001 ;  0.010)  - 0.001 (- 0.005 ;  0.003)  
Individual controls   Yes   Yes   Yes 
Regional controls   No   No   No 
    
n (individuals)   15,403   15,403   15,403 
n (regions)   136   136   136 
n (countries)   12   12   12 
M2i (region random intercepts and country fixed-effects) 
Log income    
  at beds = 2.55/1000 - 0.009 (- 0.018 ; - 0.000)    0.017 (  0.004 ;   0.031)    0.005 (- 0.004 ;   0.014)  
  at beds = 9.10/1000 - 0.005 (- 0.012 ;   0.002)    0.007 (  0.002 ;   0.012)   0.000 (- 0.005 ;   0.004)  
  at beds = 12.43/1000 - 0.003 (- 0.013 ;   0.007)    0.003 (- 0.003 ;   0.008)  - 0.003 (- 0.009 ;   0.003)  
Individual controls   Yes   Yes   Yes 
Regional controls   Yes   Yes   Yes 
    
n (individuals)   14,730   14,730   14,730 
n (regions)   129   129   129 
n (countries)   11   11   11 
Note: 95% Confidence Intervals (Cis) in parentheses. AMEs highlighted in bold if 95% CI does not include 0 (p < 0.05). Individual controls:  sex, age, ADL, IADL, 
mobility, chronic conditions, self-rated health, cognitive function, education, marital status, parent and child coresidence status, home ownership, access to car. Regional 
controls: GDP per inhabitant (PPP-adjusted), percentage of population aged 65+ over total.
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Figure 1. Percentages of care recipients receiving each type of care by LTC beds tertile 
group. LTC beds tertiles calculated over the sample of regions (n = 136). 
 
Note: the percentages receiving any home-care in each group of regions are: 20.61% (Low 
beds); 20.54% (Medium beds); 16.62% (High beds). 
